In the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), one of the longest and most brutal armed conflicts in recent memory is now escalating. According to estimates, over 700,000 people have been killed in 2025 alone. Since the March 23 Movement (M23), founded in 2012 and supported by Rwanda, began its campaign at the end of 2021, the resulting battles have claimed many, many more lives.
The international community’s sympathy for the victims of the last 30 years, which was on display when Denis Mukwege was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2018 for his efforts to combat sexualized violence as a method of warfare, seems to have dissipated. The world is looking away.
The war was triggered and is being fuelled by a ruthless hunger for resources, profit, and power. But a complex web of interconnected interests has emerged between the multitude of internal and external actors involved in the conflict, making any resolution extremely difficult.
The Economy of Violence
The DRC has a central government headed by a president, and in wide swathes of the country its influence is extremely limited. The political elite, concentrated in the capital Kinshasa, lost control of many provinces and districts quite some time ago. President Félix Tshisekedi, in office since 2018, has come to terms with this state of affairs, and has allowed provinces distant from the capital to govern themselves or be controlled by local actors.
Under these conditions, in the east a climate of unregulated access to the country’s natural resources has become the norm. Here, the military is closely intertwined with the economy, which is shaped by protection money and constantly shifting loyalties and alliances between the roughly 100 armed rebel groups active in the region.
Breaking through the tight enmeshment of economic interests and militarized violence to offer the local population any kind of security would require resolute political will on the part of the central government, as well as competent, loyal armed forces. The Congolese military, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) — is no such loyal force, however, but rather a part of the same system of wealth extraction predicated on the exploitation of resources, corruption, and protection money payments. The FARDC thus also profits from the continuation of the war, and has no interest in strengthening the country’s central authority and bringing the conflict to an end — ultimately, this would strip them of their present privileges and sources of income. The FARDC is part of the powerful “military bourgeoisie in the security sector” that survives on a form of corruption requiring a weak central administration. In this sense, the weakness of the FARDC is quite intentional.
Rwanda’s Role
The weakness of the DRC’s army and central government works to the benefit of the country’s eastern neighbours — in particular Rwanda, which has invaded the DRC multiple times in the past few decades and supported rebel groups. There were internal political motivations for this as well — during the Second Congo War in 1998, troops from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) affiliated themselves with the Congolese army. The FDLR consisted primarily of Hutu, the ethnic group who four years previously had committed the Rwandan genocide, who had fled to what was then known as Zaire ahead of attacks by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
Rwanda accuses FDLR fighters of denying the genocide and of adhering to the ideology that motivated it; the FDLR is also blamed for ongoing attacks on Rwanda and on Congo’s Kinyarwanda-speaking population. Paul Kagame, former army leader and president of Rwanda since 2000, has accused the DRC’s government of supporting the FDLR.
<<Although Museveni and Kagame have different interests, a direct military confrontation between the countries appears rather unlikely given the two presidents’ history>>.
In Rwanda, the FDLR has long been considered the primary threat to peace in the country. Ongoing trauma from the genocide of the Tutsi and fear of a new outbreak of violence run deep. The government in Kigali has sought to take advantage of this, and argues that the deployment of Rwandan troops in DRC territory is needed to nip such potential threats in the bud and do so outside of Rwandan territory. Rwanda’s government also claims to be trying to protect the Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese from the FDLR threat.
The safety concerns expressed by Kigali are at the very least overblown; the FDLR has long since been severely weakened, and poses no genuine threat to Rwanda. Moreover, ahead of Rwanda’s most recent invasion there were no indications of an increase in violence against Kinyarwanda speakers. Despite this, however, the government’s narrative is accepted by large portions of Rwanda’s traumatized population.
The M23
Following the contentious re-election of Joseph Kabila as president, the M23 rebel group was founded in the DRC in 2011 by deserting, Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese officers and former partisans from the Rwanda-back rebel army. Although the Kagame regime denied supporting the M23, in reality they provided not only logistical support but also soldiers. According to UN estimates, the number of M23 troops at the beginning of this year amounted to between 3,000 and 4,000, but may have doubled since the capture of the cities of Goma and Bukavu in the DRC’s east.
In the meantime, the M23 has aligned itself with the Congo River Alliance (AFC), a rebel military coalition formed in December 2023 and led by Corneille Nangaa, an internationally designated terrorist who has been sentenced to death by a Congolese court for war crimes. Previously a politician, Nangaa was once head of the DRC’s Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). Today, he asserts that he propelled the current DRC president Tshisekedi to his position through electoral manipulation, and now explains his rejection of the president in these terms: “If I created the monster, it is up to me to defeat it.” Nangaa and his allies have made their goal perfectly clear: to take power in Kinshasa.
At present, AFC-supported M23 rebels are continuing to advance into the DRC’s interior. Following the occupation of the cities of Goma and Bukavu in the province of South Kivu, they have since captured the town of Walikale and are now advancing towards the DRC’s fourth-largest city, Kisangani.
Ugandan Interests
While public perception is focused on the advance of the M23 and its support by Rwanda, the country’s northern neighbour Uganda has been able to consolidate its influence in the north-eastern province of Ituri relatively unnoticed. The Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF), under the leadership of General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, have achieved significant territorial gains, and are using this moment to strengthen their forces on the ground and cement their influence in the region. The narrative used to support their military intervention strongly resembles that of the Rwandan government: exploiting an existing ethnic conflict in order to justify increased military influence. In this case, the claim is that Uganda must be defended against the CODECO, an association of Lendu militias. In order to counteract the latter and other militias, including the radical Islamist Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), in 2021 Uganda and Burundi enacted a joint military operation — something which certainly displeased the Rwandan regime at the time.
But this situation, too, is more complicated than it might first appear. When it comes to General Muhoozi, he is also the son of Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, who has long-standing connections with Rwandan president Kagame. Kagame, himself from a refugee family, even fought on Museveni’s side in the Ugandan Bush War, and then became head of the military secret service following Museveni’s ascension to power. Later, a militia under his command victoriously invaded Rwanda with the support of Ugandan troops.
Although Museveni and Kagame have different interests, a direct military confrontation between the countries appears rather unlikely given the two presidents’ history. The idea that the Ugandan army would attack the M23 is an equally distant possibility as long as the latter enjoys Rwanda’s support.
On March 21, General Muhoozi travelled to a secret meeting in Rwanda with President Kagame and his most trusted security advisors, where he recommended that a “defence pact” be signed between Uganda and Rwanda. The two states appear to have already come to agreement in terms of how to negotiate their respective territorial claims in the DRC’s east, something which seems similarly true for the DRC’s southern regions, near the border to Burundi.
The War Economy
The DRC’s east is extremely rich in natural resources, particularly gold, tin, coltan, and cobalt. In addition, the region boasts fertile soil and substantial amounts of timber.
Although the extraction of gold has taken on dramatically increased importance in recent years, it is not only the region’s natural resources and the military’s participation in mining operations that have made it so economically attractive. The occupiers generate a majority of their income through the war economy, consisting of border controls, household taxes, forced agricultural labour, and protection money payments.
In any event, Uganda and Rwanda’s gold exports have increased significantly over the past few years. This benefits the military elites both in the DRC and abroad, as well as international corporations. Since the country’s economic liberalization — as well as the sale of mining rights in the early 2000s — the latter have controlled large sections of the Congolese economy. It would be difficult, however, to say that these corporations are directly responsible for the conflict, especially since their economic interests are concentrated in other provinces. Indeed, the economy of violence in the east of the DRC has largely become self-sustaining.
<<Since the outbreak of the various conflicts, there have been repeated peace talks, ceasefire agreements, disarmaments, and even the integration of some sections of the armed groups into the Congolese arm>>.
There, the withdrawal of the state has left a zone of lawlessness that is now being taken over by the rebels. In Goma and the province of Nord Kivu, the M23 has set up a parallel administration, including a governor, two vice-governors, and a number of mayors who now govern according to their rules. In order to secure this power, a significant proportion of the income generated has been invested in modern weapons systems.
Breaking the circular flow of this economy of violence will be difficult, not least because there is an international market hungry for the region’s raw materials. Such trade provides the parties to the armed conflict with fast and, most importantly, hard cash, which is neither monitored by the Central Bank of the Congo nor subject to international commercial standards or duties.
No Chance for Peace?
Since the outbreak of the various conflicts, there have been repeated peace talks, ceasefire agreements, disarmaments, and even the integration of some sections of the armed groups into the Congolese army. As early as 1999, the UN peace mission MONESCO has been stationed in the DRC’s east in order to protect the local population. There is also Southern African Development Community (SADC) peacekeeping forces deployment, with some 5,000 troops from Tanzania, Malawi, and South Africa.
Current efforts towards a ceasefire agreement are being supported by many international parties. To this end, Angola invited the M23, the DRC, and Rwanda to talks on 18 March. At the last moment, however, the M23 pulled out of the talks. Angolan leader João Lourenço, who is currently also President of the African Union (AU), declared that the attempts at mediation had failed.
In parallel to the planned meeting in Angola, a secret meeting between Tshisekedi and Kagame took place in Doha at the invitation of Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the Emir of Qatar. Since Qatar is a major investor in both countries, the Arab state’s decision to take on the role of mediator was met with a great deal of optimism. What was discussed at the meeting, however, remains unclear; what is certain is that no specific conditions for a ceasefire were negotiated. The SADC and the East African Community (EAC) also arranged a joint committee to establish a peace process in the DRC, one occupied by former presidents of Nigeria, South Africa, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, and Kenya.
It is also worth mentioning that US president Donald Trump has also sought to gain a slice of the pie. In line with his approach to Ukraine, his envoys in Kinshasa have also made any promise of peace contingent on American access to the region’s natural resources.
Yet the core issue underlying this seemingly endless conflict will be difficult to overcome. All of the various elites with an interest in the war seek to exploit the weakness of the Congolese government — whether they be located in Kinshasa, Kampala, Kigali, New York, Doha, or Shanghai. As long as those involved in the war — whether directly or indirectly — continue to profit from it, any attempts at resolution appear hopeless. Only once the trade in resources from war-torn regions is made substantially more difficult, once foreign actors begin to feel the pressure, and once the government in Kinshasa starts showing a genuine interest in putting a stop to the exploitation of its own country and its own people, will there be hope for change.
Katrin Voss
Director, Rosa Luxemburg Foundation East African Office.
Translated by Ryan Eyers and Sam Langer for Gegensatz Translation Collective.